AHIMSA IN ACTION

The Jain Contribution to India's Freedom Struggle

A Book in Twenty-One Chapters

Nonviolence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind.

— M. K. Gandhi

The soul is the maker and non-maker,
and does and undoes, and is the sufferer,
and the cause of suffering, and the destroyer of both.

— Ācārāṅga Sūtra

Preface

This is a book with a modest quarrel and a serious one. Modest, because it does not attempt to displace anyone from the standard account of India's independence: not Gandhi, not Nehru, not Patel, not Bose, not the millions of unnamed men and women who between 1857 and 1947 refused to let a foreign administration continue governing them without a fight. Serious, because it takes exception to a particular omission within that account — the near-invisibility, in most tellings, of the Jain community's contribution — and because that omission carries a philosophical error inside it that has done wider damage than the missing names alone would suggest.

The error is that nonviolence looks like passivity from a distance. The stereotype of Jains as pacifist shopkeepers, of ahimsa as a private discipline of vegetarian fastidiousness, and of the Jain community as a group whose religion made it constitutionally unavailable for political action, has settled so deep into the popular imagination that it survives even in the presence of contrary evidence. Jamnalal Bajaj is remembered as "Gandhi's fifth son" and as the founder of a business house, but not usually as a Jain freedom fighter who went to prison for his politics. Amar Chand Banthia is remembered, when he is remembered at all, as a footnote to the story of Rani Lakshmibai, not as a Jain treasurer hanged in Gwalior in 1858 for supplying the Rani's forces from the state vault. The teenage flag-hoisters shot in Madhya Pradesh in August 1942 are not usually remembered at all.

This book is an attempt to correct that. It is built on two kinds of source. The first is the general body of English-language scholarship on the independence movement, and the specific journalism and community history available on Jain participation in it. The second is a Hindi-language work titled Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain — literally, "Jains in the Freedom Struggle" — a second-edition compilation from 2006, authored by Dr. Kapoorchand Jain and Dr. (Mrs.) Jyoti Jain of the Kund-Kund Jain College at Khatauli, published by Prachya Shraman Bharti of Muzaffarnagar for the Shri Kailashchand Jain Smriti Nyas. That book runs to 474 pages and gathers, in its main directory, the biographical entries of several hundred Jain freedom fighters from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan alone, along with essays, appendices, and reproductions of period documents that its authors spent more than a decade tracking down.

What follows is neither a translation nor a summary of that book. It is an original English-language narrative that draws on it for facts — names, dates, towns, prison terms, documented incidents — and uses those facts to

build the argument that the popular story has left out. Where a specific detail comes from Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain, I say so in the surrounding text; nowhere is the original Hindi prose reproduced or closely paraphrased. Readers who want the source itself should seek out the original volume, which is more comprehensive than any single English book on the subject can currently be, and which deserves a proper English scholarly edition of its own that this book is not.

A last word on what this book is not. It is not a work of primary archival research: I have not sat in the district record offices of Sagar or Damoh reading pension files. It is not an argument for identity politics: it does not claim that Jains were disproportionately important compared to any other community in what was, by any honest reading, the most broad-based political movement of the twentieth century. And it is not a hagiography: it takes its subjects to be interesting because they were ordinary members of a community that has been miscast as absent, not because they were saints. What it is, is a book meant to put a set of specific people and a specific philosophical claim back into a conversation that has been going on for too long without them.

Introduction

A Community Miscounted

Every schoolchild in India learns the same shortlist. Nonviolence is Gandhi's, and Gandhi is Congress, and Congress is the independence movement, and the movement is the men — mostly men — who led its national campaigns from a stage. The picture is not wrong. It is compressed. It leaves out the material and philosophical scaffolding on which those national campaigns stood, and it leaves out the specific communities whose members, in numbers larger than the popular history reflects, filled the ordinary ranks of protest, funded the movement's operating expenses, printed its journalism, defended its arrested, and in a small but not trivial number of cases, died for it.

The Jain community is one of the communities missing from this shortlist, and its absence is more consequential than the absence of any single individual. A missing individual is a name to be added. A missing community is a whole line of causation to be reconstructed — because if Jains were, as the stereotype has it, sitting out the freedom struggle on principle, then the Gandhian argument that ahimsa was itself a form of political action becomes harder to sustain. If the community most closely associated with nonviolence in Indian religious tradition was the community most notably absent from a movement built on nonviolence, then the movement's own theory of itself starts to look like a rhetorical convenience rather than a live philosophical claim.

The problem is that the stereotype is wrong on the facts. Jains were not sitting the struggle out. They were in it, at every level: as financiers whose contributions kept the Indian National Congress solvent through decades of banned activity, as publishers whose journals were confiscated and shut down by the colonial state, as students who turned entire colleges into revolutionary cells during Quit India, as satyagrahis who accepted prison sentences and, in some cases, torture, as teenagers who were shot for hoisting the tricolor. The record of their participation exists. It has simply not been assembled in English in a form the general reader has any easy way to encounter.

This book is that assembly, in a preliminary form. It is organized in seven parts. Part One examines the ethical and philosophical background — the Jain tradition of ahimsa, the doctrine of anekantavada, the specific ways Gandhi drew on Jain thought through his relationship with the young mystic

and poet Shrimad Rajchandra. Part Two turns to the 1857 rebellion and the earliest documented Jain martyrs of the anti-colonial struggle. Part Three treats the Gandhian era proper: the merchant financiers who bankrolled the movement, the constructive-programme network at Wardha, the economics of Khadi. Part Four turns to voices and presses — the Deoband journal Jain Pradeep, shut down by the colonial state for arguing that Mahavira and Gandhi shared a method; the Varanasi college whose entire student body went revolutionary in 1942. Part Five is the jails: the specific individuals, town by town, who went to British prisons for political activity, including the children shot at flag-hoistings and the women who forced the state to imprison them alongside their husbands. Part Six is a partial directory, drawn from the source material, of individual freedom fighters recovered by name. Part Seven takes the argument up again after independence, considers what active nonviolence actually means as a category of political action, and closes.

Nothing in this book requires the reader to accept a claim about which community deserves more credit than another. The claim is narrower: that a specific miscount has occurred, that the record permits it to be corrected, and that the correction, when made, changes not only the roll of individuals we know about but the philosophical account of what happened between 1857 and 1947 in India.

PART One

The Ethic

Chapter One

The Stereotype and Its Cost

Ask a hundred educated Indians what image the word "Jain" calls to mind, and the answers will converge with surprising uniformity. A vegetarian diet, avoided even of onions and potatoes. A monk in white robes with a soft mouth-cloth. A businessman with a scrupulous ledger and a firm handshake at the temple door. A community, in short, of gentleness and commerce, admirable but retreating — a community whose contribution to the wider civic life of the country is imagined as material rather than political, and whose religious commitments are imagined as a reason for withdrawal from the messier parts of public conflict.

Every element of this image contains something true. Jain dietary observance is genuinely strict. Jain monastic discipline is genuinely rigorous. The Jain community has been, over centuries, disproportionately represented in Indian commerce, and the community's ethical culture around commerce — the emphasis on honest dealing, on the sanctity of debts, on charity as a religious obligation — is real and consequential. What is not true is the political inference that has been laid on top of these accurate observations: that a community with these habits must be a community that has kept itself out of politics.

This inference is doing several kinds of work at once, and it is worth being precise about each of them. It is doing the work of communal generalization, converting the discipline of a religious minority into a caricature of the whole. It is doing the work of historical convenience, letting an abbreviated account of the independence movement move faster by dropping the communities whose contributions do not fit neatly under a leader's name. And it is doing the work of philosophical evasion — because if Jains, the community most closely identified with ahimsa in the Indian religious landscape, are quietly assumed to have been absent from the movement Gandhi built around ahimsa, then the philosophical claim at the center of that movement is being handled without ever quite being examined.

The cost of the inference falls first on the individuals it erases. Amar Chand Banthia, hanged in Gwalior in 1858, is not a name most Indians know. Neither is Lala Hukumchand Jain, hanged the same year in the same wave of colonial reprisals. Neither is Udai Chandra Jain of Mandla, fourteen years old, shot dead on the morning of August 16, 1942, while carrying a flag

through a crowd. Neither is Ishwar Chand Jain of Pipariya Kalan, who stopped a train near Gadarwara station in the autumn of 1932 and hoisted the tricolor on its engine, and who was tortured in custody afterwards. Neither is Tarabai Jain Kasliwal of Mahidpur, who staged a hunger strike at a police station in 1942 until the British agreed to imprison her alongside her husband. Each of these people has been documented — by district records, by community memory, by the compilation-work of Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain, by the pension applications their families or they themselves filed after independence. They are not lost. They are simply not in the story most Indians are told.

The cost falls next on the community that produced them. A community whose members died at the gallows and in flag-hoisting processions but who are remembered instead as a community of merchants who watched from the sidelines has been done a specific and correctable injury. The injury is not primarily about pride, though pride is a legitimate consideration. It is about the accuracy of the historical record and about what an accurate record enables in the present. A community that knows its own past as a record of active participation in the shaping of the modern nation has a different relationship to that nation than a community that has been quietly told, generation after generation, that its role in the founding was passive at best.

The cost falls, finally, on the philosophical claim at the center of the freedom struggle. Gandhi did not invent satyagraha as a rhetorical flourish. He built it, over decades of experimentation in South Africa and India, as a working political technique — one whose effectiveness depended, among other things, on the existence of communities in India whose religious formation had already trained them in the habits of mind and body that satyagraha required. Jain communities were not the only such communities, but they were among the most obvious of them; and if the account of the independence movement suppresses their participation, it also suppresses evidence for the practical viability of the philosophy the movement claimed to embody. To say that Jains were absent from the movement is, indirectly, to say that ahimsa itself was politically weightless — a private ethic that even its most obvious practitioners were unwilling to bring into the public square. That is not what happened.

Chapter Two

Ahimsa as a Political Philosophy

The word ahimsa is usually translated into English as "nonviolence," and the translation is functional but thin. In the Jain understanding, ahimsa is not the absence of violence in the way silence is the absence of sound. It is a positive discipline with its own architecture, its own gradations, and its own account of why the discipline is worth the trouble. To understand why Jain participation in the freedom struggle mattered, and to understand why Gandhi looked to Jain sources when he was building satyagraha into a political tool, it helps to spend a little time inside the concept itself before returning to the historical narrative.

Jain tradition understands violence as any act, in thought, speech, or deed, that harms a living being. The scope of "living being" in Jain cosmology is unusually wide: not only humans and animals but plants, microorganisms, and even certain classes of material particle are understood to have some form of jiva, or soul-like principle, and are therefore included in the moral calculus. This is not a technical curiosity. It is the reason Jain monks sweep the ground before they walk and strain their drinking water and wear a mouth-cloth when they speak. The point of the practice is not squeamishness. It is the systematic cultivation of an attention so refined that harm becomes visible before it happens, and can therefore be avoided.

Even for laypeople who cannot practice ahimsa at the monastic level, the discipline retains its architecture. It is understood as operating on three planes simultaneously: manas, or mind; vachana, or speech; and kaya, or body. A hostile thought is a form of violence. A cruel word is a form of violence. A blow is a form of violence. And in Jain analysis, the three planes are causally connected: violent thought produces violent speech, and violent speech produces violent action, so the discipline of ahimsa must begin at the level of thought if it is to reach the level of action reliably.

This architecture has a political consequence that becomes visible only when the discipline is applied to a mass political movement. A movement that asks its participants merely to refrain from striking their opponents can be sustained by tactical discipline alone; the participants need only agree that not striking back this Tuesday will produce a better outcome by next Tuesday. A movement that asks its participants to hold to nonviolence in thought as well as action asks something categorically different. It asks them to refuse to hate the people they are opposing, even under

provocation, even under the direct experience of violence inflicted on their own bodies. And it asks this not as a tactical concession but as a moral requirement of the same order as the requirement not to strike.

Gandhi understood this. When he spoke of satyagraha as "soul-force," what he was describing was not a metaphor. He was describing the specific claim, drawn from a religious tradition older than the movement he was leading, that a discipline held to on all three planes simultaneously produced a kind of moral pressure that a discipline held to only on the plane of action could not produce. And he understood that this claim was falsifiable. If satyagrahis broke discipline under lathi-charge, if they hated their opponents even while refusing to strike them, if the movement's public face of nonviolence concealed a private appetite for retaliation, then the moral pressure the movement was trying to exert would dissipate, and the technique would collapse.

This is why Jain participation in the movement was not merely additive. It was constitutive. Jain communities had, by centuries of practice, developed exactly the internal habits of thought and speech that the Gandhian discipline required — not because their tradition anticipated a colonial political struggle, but because the tradition had been refining the discipline of ahimsa for its own religious ends for so long that it had accumulated a working technology of attention. When Gandhi asked mass audiences to hold to nonviolence in thought as well as action, he was asking something most of them had no training in. When he asked the same of Jains, he was asking for the political extension of a discipline they had been practicing since childhood.

This is one of the reasons Jain participation in the movement was disproportionate to the community's numbers. It is not that Jains had more reason than others to want the British out; every Indian community had that reason. It is that Jains had, on average, more training than others in the specific ethical discipline the movement had chosen as its method. A Jain merchant who had grown up in a household where speaking harshly of a rival was itself considered a religious lapse was, in a plain practical sense, more ready for satyagraha than a person for whom nonviolence had to be learned from scratch as an unfamiliar rule.

None of this means that every Jain participant was a philosophical adept or that Jain participants uniformly outperformed non-Jain participants in discipline under pressure. The record contains as many ordinary people as any other section of the movement. What it means is that the philosophical claim at the center of the movement — that nonviolence could function as a political technique — was not a claim floating free of any lived tradition. It

was a claim with a specific cultural ground in India, and Jain thought was one of the deepest layers of that ground. The Jain participation this book documents is the political expression of that ground turning into activity.

Chapter Three

Anekantavada and the Ethics of Persuasion

If ahimsa supplied the tactical form of Gandhian resistance, another Jain doctrine supplied something closer to its theory of persuasion. That doctrine is anekantavada, sometimes translated as "the doctrine of many-sidedness" or "non-absolutism." It is one of the two or three concepts Jain tradition considers most distinctively its own, and its influence on Gandhi's approach to political conflict runs deeper than the frequency with which Gandhi cited it might suggest.

Anekantavada holds, in a summary form the doctrine's own defenders will find brutal, that no single statement about reality captures the whole of reality. Every truth is partial. Every perspective, however carefully arrived at, sees only some faces of the object it examines and is blind to the others. This is not a licence for relativism — Jain thought is emphatic that some claims are more accurate than others, that logic is real, and that the pursuit of truth is a serious obligation. It is a discipline of intellectual humility about one's own vantage, and it produces, in its ethical application, an unusual conclusion: that one's opponent, however wrong they may be about the matters under dispute, is almost certainly right about something, and the responsibility of the person seeking truth is to find out what they are right about before pressing them on what they are wrong about.

Applied to political conflict, this doctrine produces a technique of persuasion very different from either armed struggle or ordinary parliamentary debate. Armed struggle presumes that the opponent's error can be corrected only by force. Parliamentary debate presumes that the opponent's error can be corrected by superior argument. Anekantavada-inflected engagement presumes that the opponent's error is real but is embedded in a partially-correct larger view, and that the opponent will move toward the truth faster if the persuader takes the trouble to identify and honor the truth in the opponent's position before insisting on the error.

Gandhi's approach to the British administration, and later to his own political allies with whom he disagreed, bears the mark of this technique. He did not, as a matter of habit, present his opponents as villains. He presented them as people who had gotten one important thing wrong and were owed the respect of an argument that took their own view seriously before contesting it. This is famously visible in his correspondence with the British Viceroys and Prime Ministers, in which he addressed them as

"friends" whose consciences he was appealing to. It is also visible in his less-famous correspondence with Indian opponents — including, in his later years, B. R. Ambedkar — where he tried, not always successfully, to hold the same posture of taking the opponent's position seriously before insisting on his own.

The Jain roots of this posture were not accidental. Gandhi's correspondence with Shrimad Rajchandra, whom he met in 1891 and considered his most important religious teacher after his mother, is full of exactly this kind of instruction. Rajchandra, a jeweler-poet of extraordinary spiritual precocity who died young in 1901, took Gandhi through Jain philosophical concepts at a moment in Gandhi's life when Gandhi was actively considering conversion to Christianity. Rajchandra did not argue against Christianity. He argued that Christianity was one true perspective among several, and that Jain thought offered resources Gandhi would find useful whichever tradition he ultimately made his home in. Gandhi did not convert to Jainism; he remained a Hindu. But he took Rajchandra's account of anekantavada with him, and it shaped, from that point forward, the way he engaged with people who disagreed with him.

The political consequence of this ethical formation is often missed because it is easy to conflate with mere politeness. It was not politeness. It was the operational conviction that a movement whose method was nonviolence had to also refuse the intellectual violence of caricaturing its opponents, because caricature was itself a form of himsa, and because a movement that indulged in caricature would forfeit the moral standing that nonviolence was supposed to earn it. Gandhi's insistence, sometimes to the frustration of his own colleagues, on speaking of the British with civility and of even his most obstructive opponents with an assumption of good faith, was not a personal quirk. It was the political application of anekantavada.

Jain participants in the movement inherited the same ethical formation. It shaped, quietly, the way Jain merchant financiers negotiated with British officials over commercial matters even as they funded the movement politically opposed to those officials; it shaped the way Jain lawyers defended arrested satyagrahis in colonial courts, seeking convictions that were technically correct rather than trying to lie the defendants free; it shaped the way Jain editors of independence-era journals wrote about British administrators, criticizing their policies without descending into personal vilification. This texture of the movement is easy to miss because it does not make for dramatic history. It matters because it is part of what allowed satyagraha, over decades, to hold a moral position that armed resistance could not have held for the same period.

Chapter Four

Gandhi's Jain Teachers

Every account of Gandhi's intellectual formation eventually reaches Shrimad Rajchandra, and most of them pass through him quickly. This is a mistake. Gandhi himself, in the Autobiography and in his private correspondence, was clear that he considered Rajchandra his most important spiritual teacher, and that he had considered submitting to Rajchandra as a disciple before Rajchandra's early death removed the possibility. To understand the Jain formation of Gandhi's political thought, and therefore the Jain relationship to the movement Gandhi built, one has to spend more time with Rajchandra than the standard biographies do.

Raichandbhai Ravjibhai Mehta, later known as Shrimad Rajchandra, was born in 1867 in Vavaniya, a small town in what is now Gujarat. He was, by every account of his childhood, a prodigy of religious precocity: he was said to remember his past lives, to have absorbed the Jain scriptural corpus by his teens, and to have composed philosophical poetry of the highest register while working as a jeweler in Bombay to support his family. He met Gandhi in July 1891, shortly after Gandhi's return from law studies in London, at a time when Gandhi was a young lawyer in his early twenties who had begun to encounter the religious cross-currents — Theosophy, evangelical Christianity, secular Western rationalism — that would shape the next phase of his life.

The relationship between the two men lasted a decade, until Rajchandra's death in 1901, and it developed through correspondence more than through face-to-face contact. Gandhi, then in South Africa, wrote to Rajchandra with the questions that were troubling him — about the nature of God, about the relationship between the soul and its embodiment, about the ethics of political action in a world of unjust force. Rajchandra replied in long, patient letters that took the questions seriously as philosophical questions rather than treating them as personal doubts to be soothed. He did not tell Gandhi what to believe. He mapped the terrain within which the questions could be considered, and he did so in the vocabulary of Jain philosophy that had shaped his own thought.

Gandhi later credited Rajchandra with three specific gifts. The first was the concept of ahimsa understood as a positive discipline rather than a mere restraint, applied not only to physical action but to speech and thought. The second was anekantavada, the doctrine of many-sidedness, understood as

an ethical requirement to honor the truth in an opponent's position before contesting the error. The third, less often discussed but perhaps most consequential for Gandhi's political practice, was aparigraha — the discipline of non-possession, understood not as material poverty for its own sake but as the systematic reduction of possessions and attachments to the level required to live a moral life. Gandhi's later practice of poverty, his refusal of ownership over land or capital, his willingness to travel with a single change of clothes, was Rajchandra's aparigraha translated into a political posture.

These three concepts — ahimsa, anekantavada, aparigraha — form, together, a substantial part of the philosophical infrastructure of Gandhian politics. None of them originated with Gandhi. All of them were Jain concepts that Gandhi encountered through Rajchandra and other Jain teachers, integrated with his own reading of Hindu, Christian, and Western sources, and turned into a working political vocabulary. The Gandhian originality lay not in the concepts themselves but in the scale at which he attempted to apply them: from personal ethics, where Jain tradition had refined them for centuries, to mass political action against an empire, where no tradition had ever attempted them on this scale.

Rajchandra was not the only Jain figure of influence in Gandhi's life. In South Africa, Gandhi worked closely with Jain merchants of the Gujarati diaspora, many of whom funded and staffed the early phases of his political work in Natal and the Transvaal. In India, after his return in 1915, Gandhi drew on Jain philosophical scholars and Jain financiers in roughly equal measure: the philosophical scholars gave him the intellectual materials to defend and extend his method against critics from within and outside the movement, and the financiers gave him the money and the institutional bases without which the method could not have been sustained. The two categories often overlapped in a single person: Jamnalal Bajaj, who becomes the subject of a later chapter, was at once one of Gandhi's most important financiers and a serious student of Jain thought whose adopted father-son relationship with Gandhi rested on a shared philosophical vocabulary as much as on shared political goals.

The point of tracing these relationships is not to reassign credit for satyagraha from Gandhi to his Jain teachers. Gandhi did the synthesis and Gandhi bore the political consequences of the choices that synthesis produced. The point is that the movement Gandhi built cannot be understood without its Jain intellectual and institutional infrastructure, and the Jain community's participation in the movement was not incidental to the theory of the movement but internal to it. To leave the Jain contribution out of the history of the freedom struggle is not merely to omit a set of

names. It is to render the philosophical basis of the struggle less legible than it should be.

PART Two

The First Reckoning

Chapter Five

The Merchant Networks of Old India

To understand why Jain families were positioned to participate in the freedom struggle in the ways they did — as financiers of the Gandhian movement, as treasurers in princely states who could open vaults when the moment demanded it, as owners of the printing presses on which the movement's journalism was produced — it helps to look, briefly, at the commercial and administrative geography of India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before the East India Company's conquest had fully reshaped it.

Jain merchant families had, by the eighteenth century, established themselves as one of the two or three most important commercial networks in the subcontinent. Their presence was densest in a corridor running from Gujarat and Rajasthan through Malwa and Bundelkhand into what is now Madhya Pradesh, with important secondary concentrations in the Deccan, the Karnataka coast, and Uttar Pradesh. The community's commercial specializations included banking, wholesale trade in grain and textiles, the financing of long-distance caravan commerce, and — in an important administrative extension of banking — the office of treasurer or diwan to princely and Mughal-successor states across northern and central India.

This administrative role is not incidental to the story of Jain participation in 1857. A treasurer to a princely state is not merely a banker who happens to work for a government. He is the official with keys to the physical vault in which the state's specie and precious-metal reserves are held. He controls the ledgers on which the state's fiscal life depends. He is the person any political actor within the state — the ruler, the ruler's advisors, the ruler's opponents — must persuade or coerce if physical resources are to be mobilized. When such an official is a member of a religious community whose ethical formation places extraordinary weight on the seriousness of promises and on the obligation of loyalty to the person one has agreed to serve, the political implications extend beyond the individual official's decisions. They shape what is possible for the state as a whole.

The Jain merchant network also possessed something the ordinary agrarian population of India did not: liquid capital. In an economy in which most wealth was tied up in land and in which land could not easily be converted to cash on political demand, Jain banking houses were among the few institutions capable of assembling large sums of money on short notice and

of moving them across long distances without the transaction becoming visible to the colonial administration. This capacity mattered less in 1857, when the rebellion moved faster than the financial system could follow, than it would matter later; but even in 1857, in specific localities, the ability of Jain-controlled institutions to make funds available at the right moment shaped what happened.

The community also possessed, by 1857, a set of durable institutional structures that were not directly commercial but that gave it organizational depth: temples with their own trusts, community associations that met regularly and that coordinated charitable and religious activities across long distances, printing presses that had begun by producing religious literature and would expand, over the following century, into political journalism. These institutions were not designed for political mobilization. They existed for religious and community-welfare reasons. But when political mobilization became necessary, they were available, and they gave the community an infrastructure of trust and communication that a scattered population without such institutions could not have produced on demand.

This is the background against which the specific Jain participants in the 1857 rebellion have to be understood. When Amar Chand Banthia opened the vault at Gwalior for Rani Lakshmibai's forces, he was not acting as an individual sympathizer to the rebellion. He was acting as the current holder of an office his community had held, in that state and others, for generations, and he was drawing on institutional capacities — the capacity to convert state assets into militarily usable resources, the capacity to do so with the fluency of long practice — that his position made available. When Lala Hukumchand Jain and Fakirchand Jain were hanged together on January 9, 1858, they were being executed as members of a community whose broader commercial and administrative reach the colonial administration understood to be dangerous if it turned in earnest against British rule.

The 1857 rebellion did not succeed. It was suppressed with a violence that reshaped the whole of northern India for the following generation, and one of the specific things that reshaping did was to break, or attempt to break, the political capacity of the merchant networks the rebellion had drawn on. The Jain community, along with other commercial communities associated with the rebel side, spent the next several decades absorbing the consequences of the defeat. What is remarkable is not that the community became politically quieter after 1857 — every commercial community that had been on the losing side did — but that when the political opportunity opened again, in the Swadeshi movement of the 1900s and then decisively

in the Gandhian campaigns from 1920 onward, the community's institutional and financial capacity was still there and was still available to be deployed. The continuity between the merchant princes of 1857 and the merchant princes of the Gandhian era is not a rhetorical continuity. It is an institutional one, running through the same families, the same trusts, the same banking houses, adapted for a new phase of political conflict.

Chapter Six

Gwalior, 1858: The Treasurer's Vault

The story of Amar Chand Banthia is one of those cases in Indian history where a single act of decision by a single person, made in a single moment under conditions of extreme pressure, produced consequences large enough to have earned the actor a permanent place in the popular memory of the country — and yet did not. His name is unfamiliar to most Indians. His role in the 1857 rebellion is unfamiliar even to many students of that rebellion. His death, by hanging in Gwalior in 1858, is unfamiliar even to most members of the community he belonged to. This is not for lack of evidence. It is because the standard narrative of 1857 has not made room for him. This chapter tries to.

Banthia was the chief treasurer of the princely state of Gwalior at the moment the rebellion reached central India. The state was ruled by Jayaji Rao Scindia, a young Maharaja whose political calculations through 1857 were characteristic of a category of Indian ruler navigating between the colonial administration and the rebellion: nominally loyal to the British, actively suspicious of them, unwilling to commit to the rebel side but unwilling to send his own forces against the rebellion in a decisive way. The Rani of Jhansi, Lakshmibai, arrived in Gwalior in June 1858 in retreat from British forces that had taken her own city, and she and Tantia Tope attempted to convert Gwalior into a base for continued resistance. The Maharaja fled the city. Much of his army defected to the rebel side. The Rani, briefly, held the fort.

Holding the fort required money. It required money to pay the troops who had defected. It required money to buy provisions and to purchase such ammunition as could still be procured in a region that had been under British commercial control for a generation. It required money to keep the machinery of a hastily-assembled resistance operating for even the few weeks it might have to operate before either reinforcement arrived or the British counterattack succeeded. The money existed. It was in the state treasury of Gwalior, physically held in vaults that Amar Chand Banthia, as chief treasurer, controlled.

The decision Banthia faced was not a decision most people are ever asked to make, and it was not a decision he had much time to consider. The lawful ruler of the state, to whom he had sworn an oath of service, had fled and could not be reached. The person now in effective military control of the

state was a rebel commander whose political legitimacy Banthia might or might not have accepted but whose immediate need for the funds in his vaults was undisputed. The colonial administration, whose forces were closing on the city, would treat any transfer of funds to the rebel side as an act of treason punishable by death. And the funds themselves, if left in the vault, would either be seized by the British on their arrival or become part of whatever settlement the British negotiated with the returning Maharaja — in either case, unavailable to the resistance in the days when the resistance most needed them.

Banthia opened the vault. He supplied the Rani's forces with the funds they needed to continue the fight from Gwalior. The fight, as everyone reading this knows, ended in defeat: the Rani was killed in the fighting around Gwalior on June 18, 1858, and the city fell to the British shortly afterward. The Maharaja returned. The colonial administration began the work of identifying and punishing those who had aided the rebel side. Banthia's role became known, and he was arrested.

The account of his execution that has come down through community memory and through the compilation-work of historians of Jain participation in the freedom struggle is stark. He was hanged in Gwalior, by British order, sometime in the second half of 1858. His body was, according to those accounts, publicly displayed for three days after the execution as a warning to any other resident of the region who might consider assisting the rebellion in a similar way. The warning was calibrated to the specific role Banthia had played: not to a fighter, whose execution would have been ordinary, but to a treasurer, whose execution and public display signaled to the entire class of officials on whom the colonial economy depended that the boundary between the trusted service of the colonial order and support for its enemies was to be understood as absolute.

Banthia's decision was, by any political calculation, disastrous for himself and his family. It cost him his life. It cost his family, in the years that followed, whatever protection his official position had provided them. It did not save the Rani or the rebellion. And yet the decision was one of the clearest cases in the whole history of Indian anti-colonial resistance of an official of a state weighing the demands of institutional loyalty against the demands of political solidarity with the fight for independence, and choosing the second.

That the community memory of this decision has been preserved is largely due to the work of historians and biographers within the Jain community who have refused to let it lapse. The compilation Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain gives Banthia one of its earliest and most substantial entries in its

opening section on "Immortal Jain Martyrs." A monument to him in Gwalior exists, though it is not on the standard tourist circuit. His name appears in some, but not all, general histories of 1857. What has not yet happened is the incorporation of his case into the popular narrative of the rebellion in a way that would put him in the same sentence as the Rani he supplied, the Tantia Tope who defended the city he financed, or the Scindia who fled it. That incorporation is one of the specific things a fuller history of Jain participation in the freedom struggle is meant to accomplish.

Chapter Seven

The Gallows of January

On the ninth of January, 1858, in the aftermath of the collapse of the initial rebel offensive in northern India and in a region that had seen some of the heaviest rebellion-related violence of the previous year, the British executed two men whose names have survived in the community records of the freedom struggle even though they have not survived in the national memory of it. The men were Lala Hukumchand Jain and Fakirchand Jain. They were hanged together, by British order, for their roles in supporting the rebellion. The specific charges against them, and the specific acts for which they were executed, are less fully documented than the case of Amar Chand Banthia; but the fact of their execution, and the date, and the community affiliation, are recorded in the compilation-work of Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain, who trace these details through district records and family memory in ways that individual researchers can now revisit.

The importance of these two executions is not primarily the individual biographies of the two men, which are only partially recoverable at this distance. The importance is what the two executions, together with Banthia's, tell us about the scale of Jain involvement in the 1857 rebellion. Three documented executions in less than a year, of members of the same religious community, for acts of support to the rebellion — this is not a footnote. It is a pattern. And it is a pattern of a specific kind: the pattern of a community whose members were participating in the rebellion in numbers and at levels of commitment sufficient to attract the colonial administration's attention as a class rather than as isolated individuals.

The colonial administration in the years after 1857 conducted an extensive program of retribution against Indians identified as having supported the rebellion. Some of that program is well documented in the standard histories; some of it is not. What is clear is that the administration did not distinguish between rebellion in arms and rebellion in kind. Financial support to the rebel side was treated as capital treason. So was communication with rebel commanders. So was the provision of supplies. So was the sheltering of rebel fugitives. In the specific case of the Jain community, whose members were disproportionately positioned to provide financial and administrative support of exactly these kinds, the vulnerability to colonial retribution was accordingly disproportionate.

The three cases discussed here — Banthia, Hukumchand, Fakirchand — are the ones for which the community memory has preserved names and dates. They are almost certainly not the only cases. Jain-community accounts of the 1857 aftermath include references to further executions and imprisonments across the region for which specific dates and full names have not been reliably recovered; the records that would allow those cases to be reconstructed exist, in principle, in district archives and in the papers of the princely states, but the archival work required to produce a definitive list has not been done. What the community records do preserve is the sense, transmitted from within the community, that 1857 was not an event Jain families watched from a safe distance. It was an event that reached inside Jain families and killed their members, and the community that emerged into the second half of the nineteenth century did so under the shadow of that reach.

The Gandhian era, when it arrived, would draw its own participants from the same community that had absorbed these losses. Some of the Jain financiers of the Gandhian movement in the twentieth century were grandchildren or great-grandchildren of members of the same commercial and administrative class whose relatives had been executed in the aftermath of 1857. The continuity is not a matter of hereditary revolutionary sentiment; the specific individuals who financed Gandhi were shaped by their own generation's circumstances, not by their ancestors' fates. But the community memory that they had been raised in did include the memory of what had happened after 1857, and that memory formed part of the moral background against which the twentieth-century decisions were made.

PART Three

The Gandhian Decades

Chapter Eight

Jamnalal Bajaj and the Adopted Son

The relationship between Jamnalal Bajaj and Mahatma Gandhi is one of the most instructive, and most underappreciated, in the political biography of twentieth-century India. It is a relationship that shaped, from behind the public stage, the material and institutional basis on which the Gandhian movement was able to operate for the last two decades of its most active period. It is also a relationship whose depth is misread if one takes it, as most brief accounts do, as simply the story of a wealthy merchant who admired Gandhi and gave him money. It was that, but it was also something considerably more complicated, and considerably more consequential.

Jamnalal Bajaj was born in 1889 in Kashi Ka Bas, a village in the Sikar district of what is now Rajasthan, into a family of modest circumstances. He was adopted at the age of four by Seth Bachhraj Bajaj of Wardha, in what is now Maharashtra, a wealthy Marwari merchant of the Vaishya caste whose commercial house had established itself as a substantial trading and banking operation in central India. The adoption was made under the traditional rules governing the succession of a household without a natural male heir, and the young Jamnalal was, from the point of the adoption forward, the designated inheritor of a business empire he had not been born into and had not chosen.

The Jain background of the Bajaj family, and of Jamnalal himself, is a point on which the record is layered in ways worth pausing over. The family had roots in the Jain tradition of the Marwari commercial community, and Jamnalal's religious formation drew heavily on Jain philosophical and ethical sources even as it also engaged, actively, with the broader currents of Vaishnava devotional practice and, later, with the reformist Hindu and Gandhian frameworks that shaped his adult political life. To describe him simply as a Jain merchant is to compress a more layered religious identity; to describe him without reference to his Jain formation is to miss the source of a substantial part of his ethical vocabulary. This book takes the second error to be the more damaging of the two, and treats him as a figure whose Jain formation was one of the important background influences on the Gandhian movement even where his own religious self-description was more capacious.

Jamnalal encountered Gandhi in 1915, the year of Gandhi's return to India from South Africa, and he became one of Gandhi's closest associates almost

immediately. The relationship developed quickly into something unusual: Jamnalal asked Gandhi, in 1920, to accept him as his adopted son, and Gandhi, after some initial hesitation, accepted. This was not a legal adoption. It was a designation of the kind of moral and pedagogical relationship the two men would have with each other going forward, and it was taken seriously by both. Gandhi addressed Jamnalal as "chi. Jamnalal" — the honorific "chi." being the affectionate form used for a son — in their correspondence from that point on, and Jamnalal, for his part, related to Gandhi with the deference of a son to a father in matters of ethical direction, even as he continued to run the Bajaj business affairs on his own authority.

The practical consequences of this relationship for the freedom movement were substantial. Jamnalal gave land in Wardha for the ashram that became Gandhi's base for the last phase of his life — the Sevagram ashram, founded in 1936. He funded the Gandhi Seva Sangh, the umbrella organization for Gandhi's constructive-programme work. He personally underwrote a substantial portion of the operating expenses of the Indian National Congress through the 1920s and 1930s, at moments when the Congress's finances would otherwise have been in genuine crisis. He served as the treasurer of the Congress. He was on the working committees of many of the movement's central organizations. And he did all of this while continuing to run the Bajaj commercial house, which he was under no obligation to compromise but which he did, in fact, compromise in service of the political work — accepting boycotts of his own products when the Congress called for boycotts of the goods his mills produced, closing operations at moments of political action, and generally treating the wealth of the family business as an instrument for the political work rather than a possession to be protected from it.

The pattern of Jamnalal's political action, as distinct from his financial support, is the part of the record that is most often left out of brief accounts. He was jailed by the British on multiple occasions for his own political activity. He participated personally in the salt satyagraha of 1930. He courted arrest in the temple-entry satyagraha at Nagpur in 1928, at a time when few merchants of his social standing were willing to be jailed for the cause of caste reform. He was under detention during the Quit India movement in 1942 and was still under detention at the time of his death, on February 11, 1942, at the age of fifty-three. His death was, by Gandhi's own account, one of the great personal losses of his life; Gandhi wrote of it with a directness of grief he rarely allowed himself in public writing.

The importance of Jamnalal's case for the argument of this book is not that he was individually exceptional, although he was. It is that he demonstrates,

in a single life, all four modes of Jain participation in the freedom struggle that this book has been trying to bring into focus. He was a financier of the movement at a scale that made a material difference to what the movement could do. He was a personal participant in the movement's satyagrahas and accepted the personal cost of imprisonment. He was an institutional builder whose Wardha work created the ashram base from which Gandhi operated for the last decade of his life. And he was a Jain-inflected ethical presence in Gandhi's own inner circle, one of the sources on which Gandhi drew for the philosophical grounding of the movement's specific commitments.

What Jamnalal was not, is a merchant who sat out the struggle. That he continues to be remembered primarily as an industrialist rather than as a freedom fighter is a specific piece of the miscount this book is meant to address. The Bajaj name, in contemporary India, is associated with scooters and motorcycles and appliances. It is a business name. It is also, if one is willing to read the history, one of the names that made the twentieth-century Indian freedom struggle possible.

Chapter Nine

Seth Hukumchand and the Financing of Empire

If Jamnalal Bajaj was the merchant financier whose relationship with Gandhi was closest and most personal, Sir Seth Hukumchand of Indore was, in many ways, his commercial equivalent — a Jain industrialist of enormous wealth, based in central India rather than Wardha, whose contributions to the Gandhian movement and to the Indian nationalist cause were extensive, sustained, and until relatively recently underdescribed in the general histories.

Hukumchand was born in 1874 in Indore, into a family of the Oswal Jain community, one of the traditional trading castes of the Marwari-origin merchant network. He built, over the first two decades of the twentieth century, one of the largest commercial and industrial empires in India: textile mills, banking operations, jute factories in Calcutta, shipping interests, and a network of trading houses that extended across the subcontinent and into East Africa. By the 1920s he was among the wealthiest Indians of his generation, and his commercial house was, together with those of the Birlas, the Tatas, and the Bajajs, one of the small handful of Indian business empires operating at a scale genuinely comparable to European colonial commercial firms of the period.

His relationship with the nationalist movement had its own texture, distinct from Jamnalal's. Hukumchand was not, by temperament or by choice of political style, a close personal associate of Gandhi in the way that Jamnalal was. He operated more at arm's length, moving in commercial and princely-state circles that did not overlap fully with the Congress's inner leadership, and he was more circumspect about the public display of his political sympathies than a figure closer to Gandhi's daily orbit would have needed to be. But his material support to the movement was extensive, and it took forms that were consequential in their own right.

The most important of those forms was funding for the constructive programme: the network of Khadi production, village industry, and educational institutions that Gandhi treated as the necessary counterpart to political satyagraha. Constructive-programme work was chronically underfunded, because it did not have the drama of prison-going satyagraha and was harder to fundraise for on the public appeals through which the Congress raised most of its money. Wealthy sympathetic industrialists were the constructive programme's principal financial base, and Hukumchand

was, by all accounts, one of the largest single contributors to that base for extended periods.

He also, in ways that are less easy to document but that his contemporaries repeatedly attested, provided funds directly to Congress leaders who needed them for specific political purposes — a satyagraha campaign that needed to be provisioned, a group of political prisoners whose families needed to be supported, a printing operation that needed to be capitalized in a hurry to produce material the colonial administration was likely to try to suppress. These transfers were, of necessity, not always documented at the time; they moved through the informal financial networks that the Jain and other Marwari commercial communities had built over generations for their own commercial purposes, and they were made in ways that reduced the visibility of the transaction to the colonial administration.

The colonial administration knew, of course, that Hukumchand was providing this kind of support. They knew because the political intelligence apparatus of the Raj was extensive and because there were limits to how well any transfer of the magnitudes involved could be concealed. What the administration could do about it was constrained, however, by Hukumchand's own commercial and social position. He was, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, one of the small number of Indian industrialists whose businesses were too integrated with the colonial economy to be casually disrupted, and whose personal relationships with senior British officials — commercial relationships, not political ones — were such that direct action against him would have imposed costs on the administration itself that the administration was not eager to pay. He was knighted in 1923, an honor that reflected less any political sympathy on the part of the British than a recognition of his commercial importance to the colonial economy; and the knighthood, ironically, gave him a certain protection in his political sympathies that a less commercially important figure would not have enjoyed.

This is a case, in other words, in which the commercial success of a Jain merchant family in the colonial economy created the conditions under which the same family's support for the nationalist movement could be sustained at a scale that a smaller commercial actor could not have sustained. The relationship between the two — the commercial success under colonialism and the political support to anti-colonialism — is not a hypocrisy or a contradiction. It is one of the specific mechanisms by which the movement's finances worked. Hukumchand was one of the exemplars of that mechanism, and the mechanism itself would have failed without figures like him.

His contributions extended beyond direct funding to the movement. He built and endowed schools, colleges, temples, hospitals, and community institutions that carried Jain values of ethical education and social welfare into the wider public. Some of these institutions became, in their own right, centers of nationalist activity — as sites where nationalist journalists could publish, where students could organize, where Congress meetings could be held without the immediate scrutiny that would have attended a meeting on more obviously political premises. This kind of institutional support is harder to trace than direct funding of the Congress, but it is not less important. It is part of what allowed the movement to have a physical presence in Indian civil life during periods when its own official organizations were banned.

Hukumchand died in 1959, twelve years after the independence he had helped fund. His commercial house continues to exist. His name is not, in contemporary India, a household name outside the specific communities that remember it. The recovery of his role in the freedom movement is one of the specific pieces of work that a fuller history of the movement would need to do, and this chapter is an initial contribution to that recovery rather than the full biographical treatment his contributions deserve.

Chapter Ten

The Ledger of Freedom

It is worth stepping back from the individual biographies of Bajaj and Hukumchand to consider the more general fact of merchant financing of the Indian freedom struggle, because the general fact is part of the argument this book is trying to make and it is a part that is often obscured by the way the movement's history is told.

The Indian National Congress, from its founding in 1885 through independence in 1947, was a political organization that operated for most of its existence either outside or on the edge of legality. It did not have taxation power. It did not receive foreign funding of the kind that would later characterize post-colonial politics. It could not, for most of its history, raise money through corporate channels because most Indian corporate wealth was tied up in businesses that would have faced immediate British retaliation for open political contributions. Its revenues came from membership dues, from public appeals at rallies, from the sale of newspapers and pamphlets, from the small contributions of its ordinary members — and from the large contributions of a small number of wealthy Indian merchant and industrial families who were willing to accept the risks of directly funding a political movement whose activities were, in various periods, formally illegal.

Those large contributions mattered out of proportion to the number of donors making them. The public appeals raised money that was often visible, symbolically important, and politically valuable — the story of an ordinary widow contributing her savings to the movement is worth telling, and the tellings are worth preserving — but the sums involved were rarely large enough to fund a national campaign at the scale the campaigns actually reached. The salt satyagraha of 1930, the sustained boycott of British goods through the 1920s, the constructive-programme network that Gandhi built through the 1930s, the mass mobilization of Quit India in 1942 — these operations required substantial and sustained funding, and the funding came, in large part, from a set of merchant financiers whose names are largely absent from the standard accounts.

A partial list of those financiers, drawn from the published accounts of the period, includes: G. D. Birla, of the Marwari Hindu commercial community, whose contributions were extensive and whose personal relationship with Gandhi was one of the most important financial anchors of the Gandhian

movement. Ghanshyam Das Birla and his family were not Jain, but they were of the same broader Marwari commercial network in which Jain families were embedded and with which they shared commercial and political sensibilities. Jamnalal Bajaj, discussed above. Seth Hukumchand, discussed above. Purushottamdas Thakurdas, a Gujarati Hindu commercial figure who worked closely with the Congress. Dorabji Tata, whose contributions were less focused on Gandhi personally but who provided substantial support to a range of Indian institutions that carried nationalist purposes. A number of smaller Jain merchant families whose contributions were individually less prominent but whose cumulative effect was substantial.

The Jain share of this financing network is not, based on the available evidence, susceptible to precise quantification. What is clear is that Jain financiers were disproportionately represented in the network relative to the community's share of the general population, that the Bajaj and Hukumchand houses were among the largest single contributors within it, and that the community's traditional networks for moving money over long distances without full disclosure to state authorities gave the movement a specific kind of financial infrastructure that the alternative — dependence on formal banking channels within the colonial economy — could not have provided.

This is one of the specific ways in which Jain participation in the freedom struggle was not merely additive to the movement but constitutive of it. A movement that had had to rely only on public appeals and on the small contributions of ordinary members could not have operated at the scale the Gandhian movement reached. The scale required substantial private financing, and the substantial private financing required a specific kind of financier — one wealthy enough to make contributions of the magnitude required, willing to accept the political risk of being identified as a funder of banned activity, and connected to the informal financial networks that could move the money without full colonial visibility. Jain merchant families were disproportionately represented in the small population of Indians who met all three of these requirements simultaneously, and the movement's financial history is, in that specific sense, disproportionately a Jain story.

Chapter Eleven

Khadi, Wardha, and the Constructive Programme

Gandhi's constructive programme is one of the parts of his political method that is easiest to underestimate. It looks, from a distance, like the least dramatic component of the movement — a set of activities involving spinning wheels, village industries, basic education, and rural reconstruction, none of which produced the newspaper photographs that satyagraha produced and none of which is included, in most textbook accounts, as central to the story of how India achieved independence. This underestimation is a mistake. The constructive programme was, in Gandhi's own view, the necessary counterpart to political satyagraha — the work that would give the eventual independent India the moral and economic base on which self-rule could be built.

The base of the constructive programme's operations, for the last decade and a half of its most active phase, was Wardha in the Central Provinces, on land given by Jamnalal Bajaj to the Gandhi Seva Sangh and other allied organizations. The Sevagram ashram, founded there in 1936, became Gandhi's residence and the physical center of the constructive-programme network. The All India Village Industries Association, founded in 1934, operated from the same region. The Hindustani Talimi Sangh, which developed Gandhi's Nai Talim educational philosophy, was also based there. The concentration of these institutions in Wardha was not accidental; it reflected the deliberate creation, by Jamnalal Bajaj and his associates, of a physical and institutional base for the movement's constructive work in a region whose commercial and political character had been shaped by Jain merchant activity for generations.

The Jain contribution to the constructive programme extended beyond the provision of the physical base at Wardha. The Khadi movement, in particular, depended on financing and commercial logistics that Jain merchant houses were unusually well-placed to provide. Khadi was, in its economic logic, a hand-spun and hand-woven cloth industry designed to displace imported British machine-made textiles from the Indian mass market. To succeed, it needed to be produced in enormous quantities, distributed across a subcontinent, and sold to consumers at prices that were competitive with British imports. None of these requirements could be met by artisanal production alone; they required commercial infrastructure. The Khadi commercial infrastructure that emerged over the 1920s and 1930s drew heavily on the same trading and banking networks that Jain and other

Marwari commercial families operated for their own commercial purposes, adapted for the specific political and economic purposes of the movement.

The results are visible in the accounts of the movement itself. By the mid-1930s, the All India Spinners Association employed hundreds of thousands of spinners across rural India, produced millions of yards of cloth annually, and had established a distribution network that reached from the smallest villages to the largest cities. The organization's financial base depended, for its ongoing operations, on the continued contributions of merchant sympathizers, including a substantial Jain contingent; on the willingness of Jain and other Marwari-network trading houses to carry Khadi products on commercial terms that were less favorable than the alternatives their commercial rationality would have preferred; and on the philanthropic support of merchant families whose contributions to the movement flowed through Khadi as one of the channels most acceptable to their own religious and ethical sensibilities.

The constructive programme also included, beyond Khadi, a range of other activities in which Jain contributions were substantial. Village industry — hand-made oil, soap, jaggery, and paper — drew on Jain financing and Jain organizational involvement. Basic education, particularly in the Hindi-speaking north and center where Jain communities were most densely settled, drew on Jain philanthropic funding and, in a number of cases, on the direct involvement of Jain educators. Rural health and sanitation work, though less well documented, appears to have drawn on similar sources of support.

The importance of this activity for the argument of this book is that it demonstrates a category of participation in the freedom movement that is often invisible to the standard narrative and that Jain communities were disproportionately well-placed to sustain. The standard narrative treats the freedom movement as a series of dramatic political events — the salt march, the Quit India resolution, the various negotiations with the British over transfer of power — punctuating longer periods of relative quiet. This treatment leaves out the ongoing, unglamorous, expensive institutional work that sustained the movement between the dramatic events, and it accordingly leaves out the communities whose contributions were concentrated in that ongoing work rather than in the dramatic events. Jain communities were, on the evidence, one of those communities.

PART Four

Voices and Presses

Chapter Twelve

The Deoband Journal and the Seizure of April

Among the appendices of Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain, the compilers Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain preserve a set of period documents that they considered too specific to summarize away in their own prose, and that they reproduced in the form the documents had originally taken so that later readers could examine them directly. One of these documents is an article that had originally been published in a small Urdu-language Jain religious journal called Jain Pradeep, produced in the town of Deoband in what is now Uttar Pradesh, across two issues in the spring of 1930: the April issue, and the combined May–June issue. The article's title, in translation from the Urdu, was "Lord Mahavira and Mahatma Gandhi." Its author was Babu Jyoti Prasad Jain of Deoband.

The article's argument, as far as it can be reconstructed from summaries and from the fragmentary references to it in later community writing, was that the philosophical foundation of Gandhi's satyagraha was continuous with the philosophical teaching of Mahavira, the last of the twenty-four Tirthankaras of Jain tradition, whose life and doctrine had established the classical Jain framework of ahimsa as an ethical and metaphysical principle. The article did not, so far as we can tell, argue that Gandhi was a Jain, or that satyagraha was a Jain movement, or that the political program of the Indian National Congress was a Jain program. It argued something narrower and more consequential: that the specific philosophical operation at the heart of satyagraha — the treatment of nonviolence as a positive discipline capable of producing political effects — was continuous with a religious and philosophical tradition that Jains had been transmitting for two and a half millennia, and that Indians who wished to understand what Gandhi was proposing could learn something useful by looking at that tradition.

This is not, on its face, an inflammatory argument. It is, from the point of view of contemporary religious-studies scholarship, a plausible and defensible one. What it was, from the point of view of the colonial administration in the spring of 1930, was an argument the administration wanted very much not to see spread. The spring of 1930 was the season of the Dandi salt march, which Gandhi had begun on March 12 and which had, by the time the Jain Pradeep article's second installment appeared in May–June, produced one of the most successful political mobilizations of the entire independence struggle. The colonial administration was engaged, at

exactly this moment, in an increasingly aggressive campaign to prevent the further spread of the argument that satyagraha was a legitimate and effective form of political action. And here was a small religious journal in a provincial town, publishing an argument that linked the current satyagraha to the deepest religious traditions of Indian civilization, in a language — Urdu — that would carry the argument into a specific and important cross-communal audience.

The administration's response was direct. It moved against the journal under the Press Act, seized the security deposit that the journal had, like all publications of its class, been required to post with the government at the time of registration, and made clear that continued publication would result in continued seizures. Jain Pradeep, which had operated on the modest financial base typical of small religious journals of the period, could not sustain the loss. It ceased publication.

This case is small in scale and large in what it demonstrates. A single article in a small religious journal in a provincial town was significant enough, in the political calculation of the colonial administration, to justify the destruction of the journal that published it. The article was significant not because it called for violence — it did not, and could not have, given the tradition it was invoking — but because it made an argument that, if allowed to spread, would strengthen the philosophical and political foundations of the satyagraha the administration was actively trying to contain.

The case is also a specific rebuttal to the passivity stereotype. A community whose journalists were being censored and shut down by the colonial state, for publishing arguments about the political relevance of the community's own religious traditions, is not a community that had absented itself from the political struggle. It is a community whose members were being actively targeted by the colonial administration for the political effects of their religious writing. And the specific political effect the administration feared — the linkage of Mahavira to Gandhi, of ancient Indian religious tradition to contemporary anti-colonial politics — was exactly the linkage that this book has been arguing is central to the philosophical basis of the freedom struggle.

Babu Jyoti Prasad Jain, the author of the article, continued to write and to work within Jain community institutions after the closure of Jain Pradeep. He is remembered within the community as one of the intellectual figures of the interwar period who helped articulate, in accessible language, the political relevance of Jain philosophical tradition. His article, preserved as an appendix in the Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain compilation, is one of

the specific documents that would repay full translation and scholarly treatment as part of the ongoing recovery of Jain contributions to the independence movement.

Chapter Thirteen

Jain Sandesh and the National Press

If Jain Pradeep represented the small-provincial-journal end of Jain nationalist publishing in the interwar period, Jain Sandesh — a periodical of larger circulation and more sustained institutional support — represented the other end: a community journal that operated at a scale sufficient to reach a national Jain audience and that used that reach, at critical moments in the movement, to place the community's participation in the freedom struggle on the record.

The most consequential of those moments, for the argument this book is making, was the publication in January 1947 — five months after the transfer of power was in view and seven months before it was formally executed — of a special national issue of Jain Sandesh devoted to the Jain contribution to the freedom struggle. The issue included what the compilers of Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain describe as a set of substantial essays and biographical accounts, drawing on the specific memories of Jain participants in the movement at a moment when many of the participants were still alive and available to be interviewed.

Two documents from that issue are preserved as appendices in the later Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain compilation. The first is an essay titled, in translation, "What Is Nationality?" written by Pandit Chainsukhdas Nyayatirtha, one of the leading Jain philosophical scholars of the mid-twentieth century. The essay addresses the question of what it means, from within Jain ethical tradition, to belong to a nation — a question with obvious political weight in the months before Indian independence and Partition, and one that Jain thought had specific resources to bring to bear. The second is an account, written by a former student named Devendra Jain, of the Syadvad Mahavidyalaya in Varanasi and the role of its student body in the Quit India movement of 1942, which is treated in the next chapter.

Chainsukhdas Nyayatirtha's essay is worth pausing over, because it addresses directly a question that this book has been circling: what is the relationship between a religious identity and a national identity, and how should a member of a religious minority think about political participation in a struggle for national independence? The essay's argument, as far as it can be reconstructed from summaries, is that Jain ethical tradition does not require withdrawal from political life but rather transforms the terms on which political life should be conducted. The nation, in this view, is not a

collective identity that transcends religious identity, but a field of ethical relationships that religious identity can inform. A Jain participating in a national movement is not thereby diluting their Jainism; they are extending its ethical requirements into a new field of application. This is not a novel philosophical claim, and it is not one specific to Jain thought — comparable arguments have been made from within many religious traditions — but the fact that a leading Jain scholar was making it, in a Jain community journal, in January of 1947, is itself part of the evidence this book is trying to assemble.

Jain Sandesh continued to publish after independence and remains an active community publication. The specific issue discussed here has become, over time, one of the key primary sources for later historians of Jain participation in the freedom movement, and the two essays preserved as appendices in Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain are among the specific documents that mark the shift from active-participant memory to historical recovery. The compilers of the later book worked, in effect, in the space between those two moments — after most of the participants were dead but while the documentary record of their participation was still susceptible to being assembled.

Chapter Fourteen

The Students of Syadvad Mahavidyalaya

The Syadvad Mahavidyalaya of Varanasi, founded in the early twentieth century as a college devoted to the study of Jain philosophical and religious tradition, is one of the more remarkable institutional stories of Jain participation in the freedom struggle, and it is a story that comes down to us primarily through the account of a former student, Devendra Jain, whose essay in the January 1947 issue of Jain Sandesh preserved the memory of what happened at the college during the Quit India movement of 1942.

The Syadvad Mahavidyalaya was, in its ordinary academic character, a small residential institution whose student body drew from Jain families across northern India and whose curriculum emphasized the classical study of Jain philosophical texts, Sanskrit and Prakrit, and the interpretive traditions of the various Jain sectarian schools. It was not, on any ordinary account of its purpose, a nationalist political institution. Its founders had established it to preserve and transmit a specific body of religious and philosophical learning, and its students, in the ordinary course of their studies, were being trained for careers as scholars, teachers, and religious educators within the Jain community.

What Devendra Jain's account describes is the transformation of this institution, over the summer and autumn of 1942, into a substantially different kind of place. The Quit India resolution of August 1942 produced, across northern India, an eruption of student and youth participation in anti-colonial activity that far exceeded anything the Congress leadership had planned for or could effectively coordinate. Students in Varanasi and in many other university towns of northern India went into the streets, organized processions, disrupted colonial administration where they could, and in a substantial number of cases were arrested, jailed, or killed.

The Syadvad Mahavidyalaya's participation in this eruption was, on Devendra Jain's account, close to total. Nearly the entire student body — a body of religious scholars in training at what would ordinarily have been considered one of the least politicized institutions of higher education in India — turned toward revolutionary activity in the weeks after the Quit India resolution. Students left their studies, joined underground political networks, participated in acts of protest and sabotage of colonial infrastructure, and in a number of cases went to prison for extended periods. Some of them did not return to their studies afterward. Some of

them went on to political careers after independence. Some of them died in the course of their political participation.

The importance of this case is not primarily in its scale. The number of students involved was, in absolute terms, small compared to the numbers of students at larger and more politically prominent universities. The importance is in what the case tells us about the reach of the Quit India moment. When the students of a Jain religious college in Varanasi, an institution whose curriculum was as far from ordinary political activity as any institution of Indian higher education could have been, went out into the streets in numbers approaching universality, the movement had reached a depth of penetration into Indian social life that the colonial administration was not going to be able to contain.

It is also, for the argument of this book, a specific rebuttal to the passivity stereotype. A college whose ordinary business was the study of ahimsa and Jain metaphysics, whose students were being trained as future religious scholars rather than as political actors, was one of the institutions whose members participated most completely in the most militant phase of the Indian nationalist movement. The stereotype of the Jain community as constitutionally unavailable for political action does not survive contact with the specific case of the Syadvad Mahavidyalaya students of 1942, and it is worth remembering that this case is only the best-documented of a category of Jain educational institutions whose members participated in the movement in comparable ways.

PART Five

The Jails

Chapter Fifteen

Madhya Pradesh in the August Days

The Quit India movement of August 1942, in the geography of central India that is now the state of Madhya Pradesh, produced some of the most concentrated instances of Jain participation in the freedom struggle for which the documentary record has survived. This is partly a function of the density of Jain settlement in the region: the corridor from Sagar through Damoh, Jabalpur, Mandla, Betul, and Indore contained a substantial Jain population, embedded in the local commercial and administrative life of small towns and district centers across the region, and the mass mobilization of Quit India accordingly drew on that population at rates that produced a specific and identifiable regional record.

The pattern of participation, as it can be reconstructed from the surviving records, followed the general pattern of the Quit India movement across northern India: flag-hoisting processions, attacks on colonial administrative infrastructure, disruption of colonial communication and transport, and — in the more sustained cases — participation in the underground networks that continued political activity into 1943 and beyond, after the initial wave of arrests had removed most of the visible leadership. What is distinctive about the Madhya Pradesh Jain participation is the specific texture of the individual cases: the ages of the participants, the willingness to accept lethal risk in the course of public protest, and the extent to which the participation drew on family and community networks rather than on the formal Congress organization that had been decapitated by the mass arrests of August.

Sabulaal Jain of Gadhakota, in the Sagar district, was born in 1923. He was nineteen years old on August 22, 1942, when he participated in a Quit India procession that attempted to hoist the tricolor at the local police station. The colonial authorities opened fire on the procession. Sabulaal Jain was killed. His death, along with a number of others in the same period, was one of the specific events that established, in the community memory of Sagar district, the scale of the price the Quit India moment had exacted.

Udai Chandra Jain of Mandla was born on November 10, 1922. He was fourteen years old on August 16, 1942 — a schoolboy by the ordinary reckoning of the time, not a college student or a young man of political age — when he led a Quit India flag-hoisting procession in his home town. He too was shot dead by colonial forces. His death, along with Sabulaal Jain's

and the others of the same period, is remembered in the community records as one of the specific instances in which the Jain population of central India paid, in the currency the colonial administration most readily imposed, for its participation in the movement.

Magan Laal Oswal, born in 1906 in Jaora in what is now the Ratlam district of Madhya Pradesh, was a mature adult at the time of Quit India rather than a teenager. He led a Quit India procession in Jaora on September 6, 1942 — several weeks after the initial wave of mobilization — and was fatally wounded in the course of the procession. He did not die immediately; he lived, in the deteriorating condition of a man carrying injuries beyond the medical capacity of the period to fully treat, for more than three years, and finally died on December 23, 1945. The distance between his injury and his death is one of the specific facts that community-history accounts of his case have preserved, because it changes the character of the loss: not the immediate death of a man in the moment of protest, but the extended dying of a man whose injuries had made continued life impossible, whose family had absorbed the cost of his sustained deterioration, and whose eventual death at the very end of the war was as much a death of the Quit India movement as the deaths that had occurred in the immediate weeks of protest.

Singhai Prem Chand Jain of Damoh was arrested on January 14, 1941 — before the Quit India movement proper, in the period of individual satyagraha that Gandhi had launched in October 1940 as a response to the British decision to bring India into the Second World War without consulting the Congress. Prem Chand Jain had publicly opposed British recruitment efforts for the war, and his arrest and four-month sentence followed from that opposition. He died in jail in 1941, in circumstances that community accounts of his case describe as suspected poisoning. The suspicion, in the nature of the case, cannot be conclusively demonstrated at this distance. What can be documented is that a Jain political prisoner, arrested for opposition to imperial war recruitment, died in colonial custody within months of his arrest and under circumstances his community found sufficiently suspicious to record and preserve the suspicion in their historical accounts.

These four cases — Sabulaal, Udai Chandra, Magan Laal, Prem Chand — are the ones whose specific facts are most fully preserved in the accessible records. They are not the only cases. The Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain compilation includes numerous other Madhya Pradesh Jain names from the same period whose entries in the alphabetical directory record prison terms, involvement in specific incidents, and in some cases deaths. A full biographical treatment of the Madhya Pradesh Jain participation in Quit

India would take more space than a single book chapter can provide, and it would require the kind of district-archival work that the current draft has not attempted. What this chapter offers is a demonstration, through the specific cases whose facts are firmest, of the shape of the participation the fuller work would document.

Chapter Sixteen

The Children Who Went to Prison

Two of the cases in the previous chapter — Udai Chandra Jain, fourteen years old at the time of his death, and Sabulaal Jain, nineteen — belong to a category that runs through the record of Jain participation in the Quit India movement and that deserves its own accounting: the category of children and adolescents who participated in the political action of August 1942 and after, and who paid, in a small but significant number of cases, with their lives.

The presence of children in the Quit India movement was not, as it might appear from the outside, a failure of adult supervision. It was a specific feature of the movement's character, and it reflected several distinct dynamics that are worth examining before returning to the specific Jain cases.

First, the mass arrests of August 1942 removed nearly the entire adult leadership of the Congress from public political life within a matter of days. The movement that continued through the autumn of 1942 and into 1943 was largely a movement of the second- and third-tier participants who had not been arrested in the initial sweeps — and this population, by the ordinary demographic distribution of political participation, skewed younger than the leadership. When the visible leaders were in jail, the visible faces of the continued protest were younger people, including in some cases very young people.

Second, the tactical form the movement took in its post-arrest phase — flag-hoisting processions, symbolic disruption of colonial infrastructure, the physical assertion of Indian presence in spaces the colonial administration had claimed for itself — was tactically accessible to younger participants in a way that many other forms of political action would not have been. A child could carry a flag. A teenager could march. The kinds of tactics that would have required political experience or organizational sophistication were largely closed to those in prison; what remained was the kinds of tactics that could be carried out by anyone willing to accept the physical risk.

Third, the physical risk itself was distributed differently under the tactical conditions of Quit India than it had been in earlier phases of the movement. The colonial administration's response to the mass protests included, in a substantial number of documented cases, the use of live ammunition against unarmed demonstrators. When such ammunition was used against a

procession that included children and teenagers, the children and teenagers died at the same rate as the adults. Udai Chandra Jain died because a child leading a procession was not a category of participant against whom the colonial forces had been trained to hold their fire; he was, in the operational reality of an August morning in Mandla, simply one of the people in the crowd on which the order to fire had been given.

The moral character of these deaths is worth thinking about clearly, because it is easy to misread. The deaths were not, on the record, the results of adult political actors having recruited or manipulated children into positions of danger. They were the results of a mass political mobilization in which children, on their own initiative and often in the face of adult attempts to keep them out of the more dangerous forms of participation, insisted on being present. Udai Chandra Jain was, by every account of his case, a boy who had understood the political stakes as they were being explained to him and who had chosen — as a fourteen-year-old chooses, which is imperfectly but not unseriously — to place himself in the front of the procession he led. His death was a moral outrage against the colonial power that authorized the use of lethal force against unarmed demonstrators. It was not a moral failure of the community that produced a boy willing to be at the front of the procession.

The Jain community's participation in this specific category of the freedom struggle — the participation of adolescents, and in a small number of cases children — is part of what the passivity stereotype most systematically obscures. A community imagined as retreating from political conflict does not send its fourteen-year-olds into flag-hoisting processions in the face of colonial rifles. That some Jain families did send their children into those processions, and that some of those children died, is one of the specific facts about which the historical record has to be clear if the stereotype is to be dismantled.

Chapter Seventeen

The Torture Cases

The colonial administration's response to Indian political activity, across the whole of the period this book covers, included the routine use of physical violence against detained political prisoners. This use of violence is one of the parts of the freedom-struggle history that the standard accounts tend to summarize rather than describe, and it is worth being direct about the reasons for the reticence. Torture is unpleasant to write about and unpleasant to read about, and the specific descriptions of what happened to specific people in colonial custody are among the parts of the historical record that carry the strongest emotional charge even at a distance of seven decades. A responsible narrative of the freedom struggle has to include these cases, however, because leaving them out both minimizes the actual cost of the struggle and obscures the specific character of the political discipline that continued participation in the face of these costs required.

Ishwar Chand Jain of Pipariya Kalan in the Jabalpur district is one of the specific cases in which the community records of Jain participation in the freedom struggle preserve the memory of prolonged colonial torture in custody. Ishwar Chand Jain's political act — the act for which he was arrested and imprisoned — was the stopping of a moving train near Gadarwara railway station in the autumn of 1932 and the hoisting of the tricolor flag on the engine of the stopped train. This was, in its own right, an act of significant physical daring: stopping a train required either mechanical intervention or the willingness to place one's body on the tracks in a way that carried real risk of death by the train's failure to stop. Hoisting a flag on the engine required climbing onto the engine of a stopped train in the presence of colonial railway officials and, most likely, colonial police whose presence at the station would have been immediate.

Ishwar Chand Jain was arrested for this act and imprisoned from September 30, 1932, to March 8, 1933 — a period of approximately six months, corresponding to the sentence imposed for the specific offense. The imprisonment, on the accounts preserved in the community records, involved the use of severe torture against him in custody. The specific forms of the torture are described in the community records in terms whose accuracy at this distance cannot be independently verified, but which are consistent with the more general pattern of colonial custodial practice documented in other cases of the period: beatings, exposure, deprivation of food and water, and other physical mistreatment calibrated to produce

compliance without leaving marks that could be independently verified after release.

Ishwar Chand Jain survived his imprisonment. He was released on the completion of his sentence in March 1933, in a physical condition that the community records describe as substantially deteriorated from his condition at the time of arrest. He returned to his family. He did not, on the accounts available, return to the same level of active political participation in the following period — a common pattern among those who had been subjected to prolonged custodial torture, whose willingness to accept future imprisonment was often permanently reduced by the specific memory of what imprisonment had involved. He remained, however, part of the community memory of the freedom struggle in his region, and his case is preserved in the compilation-work of Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain as one of the specific documentations of the physical cost of participation in the movement.

His case is not the only one. The compilation includes references to a number of other Jain political prisoners who were subjected to severe treatment in custody, some of whose specific cases are more fully documented and some of whose are recorded only in summary form. The pattern, across these cases, is clear enough to permit a general statement: participation in the freedom movement, for members of the Jain community as for members of every other community that participated, carried a real and substantial risk not only of imprisonment but of physical mistreatment in the course of imprisonment. The men and women who accepted this risk were accepting something considerably more concrete than a period of detention. They were accepting the specific possibility that the detention would include the deliberate infliction of physical suffering on their bodies by colonial officials operating with the effective impunity that the colonial legal system extended to itself in such matters.

This acceptance is part of what active nonviolence means, in the specific form the Gandhian movement gave it. The satyagrahi's discipline was not merely to refrain from striking their opponents; it was also to accept, without responding in kind, whatever the opponents chose to do to them. The Jain participants in the movement who accepted this discipline, and who then experienced its full application in the form of custodial torture, were the ones on whom the philosophical claim of nonviolent resistance was most severely tested. The tradition to which they belonged — the Jain tradition, with its centuries of practice in the discipline of accepting suffering rather than causing it — was one of the resources on which they drew in the specific hours and days when the discipline had to be held

under conditions that no philosophical training in the abstract could have prepared them for.

Chapter Eighteen

Women in the Jails

The participation of women in the Indian freedom struggle is one of the categories of the historical record that has, over the past several decades, been most extensively recovered and re-examined by professional historians, and any account of the movement written now that does not include substantial attention to women's participation is an account that is failing to keep up with the state of the scholarship. This book has been, in its earlier chapters, closer to that failure than the state of the scholarship warrants, and this chapter is an initial attempt at partial correction.

The initial correction is one of quantitative fact. Women were present, in numbers larger than the standard accounts of the movement tend to reflect, in every phase of Jain participation in the freedom struggle from the Swadeshi period through independence. The compilation-work of Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain records, in its alphabetical directory of individual freedom fighters, a substantial number of women's names — including Shrimati Angoori Devi Jain, Shrimati Kesharbai, Shrimati Phoolkunwarbai Chordia, and others whose individual entries record the specifics of their participation. The number of women's entries is smaller than the number of men's entries, which reflects both the smaller number of women who were formally categorized as freedom fighters under post-independence pension schemes and the specific difficulties involved in recovering women's participation from records that had tended to attribute political actions to male family members rather than to the women who had actually undertaken them. Even after these two forms of undercounting are acknowledged, the number of women's entries is large enough to make clear that Jain women's participation in the movement was substantial and continuous.

Tarabai Jain Kasliwal of Mahidpur, in the Ujjain district of what is now Madhya Pradesh, has been mentioned in previous chapters as one of the specific documented cases of Jain women's participation in the freedom struggle. Her case is worth examining in more detail here because it illustrates a particular dynamic that appears in a number of women's cases from the period: the woman's participation began as a response to the arrest of a male family member, developed into an independent claim on the political situation, and produced a specific confrontation with the colonial administration on terms the administration had not anticipated and did not know how to handle.

The specific sequence of events, as it appears in the community records, was as follows. Kasliwal's husband was arrested by the colonial administration in 1942 for his participation in the Quit India movement. His arrest was, in itself, unremarkable — it was one of thousands of comparable arrests in the same period across central India. What was remarkable was Kasliwal's response to it. She insisted, in demands directed at the colonial administration through whatever channels were available to her, that she be imprisoned along with her husband — not that he be released, which would have been the ordinary form of a wife's protest against her husband's imprisonment, but that she be permitted to share the imprisonment on the grounds that her political sympathies were identical to his and that she was, therefore, equally guilty of whatever offense had produced his detention.

The colonial administration did not know what to do with this. It was not, in the ordinary course of its operations, in the business of imprisoning women who had not themselves been arrested for specific offenses. It was accustomed to a political situation in which women were understood as passive dependents whose relationship to political conflict was mediated by their male relatives, and Kasliwal's insistence on being imprisoned as a political actor in her own right was, from the administration's point of view, a category error that the administration's operational categories were not designed to accommodate.

Kasliwal responded to this administrative confusion by taking her demand to the physical premises of the local police station and beginning a hunger strike on those premises. A hunger strike, at a police station, by a woman who had not been arrested but was demanding to be arrested, was a form of political action for which the local colonial officials had no standard procedure. They tried, on the accounts available, to persuade her to leave. She refused. They tried to ignore her. She continued her strike. Eventually, in a decision that appears to have been made locally rather than through any formal chain of colonial administrative review, they arranged for her imprisonment on terms she would accept — that is, on terms that treated her imprisonment as a political detention in its own right rather than as the extension of some other administrative category.

The Kasliwal case is one of the specific instances in which a Jain woman forced the colonial administration to recognize her claim to political agency on terms the administration had not been prepared to concede. Her case is not the only such instance; the community records preserve several comparable cases whose specific details vary but whose general shape is similar. What all of these cases have in common is the assertion, by Jain women, of a right to participate in the political costs of the freedom movement on equal terms with the men of their families and communities —

an assertion that was, in the political culture of the period, considerably more radical than it now sounds.

The full recovery of Jain women's participation in the freedom struggle is, as noted earlier, part of the work that the current draft has not attempted and that a fuller version of this book would need to undertake. The materials for such a recovery exist: in the compilation-work of Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain, which preserves individual entries for a substantial number of women participants; in the pension records of the post-independence Indian government, which include applications filed by or on behalf of Jain women political prisoners; in the oral histories of the surviving families of participants, which have in some cases been recorded and in many cases still exist as living memory awaiting recording. The current chapter is an initial contribution to this work rather than a comprehensive treatment, and its limitations are stated so that the reader understands what a more complete account of the same material would look like.

PART Six

The Roll

Chapter Nineteen

A Directory Reconstructed

The Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain compilation, Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain, contains as its central and most extensive section an alphabetical directory of individual Jain freedom fighters from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, drawn from correspondence, family memory, and district records that the compilers gathered over more than a decade of active research. The directory runs, by its own table of contents, across several hundred pages of the book, with each entry ranging from a few lines to a page or more depending on the depth of surviving documentation for the specific individual. The directory is one of the most substantial collections of biographical data on Jain participants in the freedom struggle that has ever been assembled in a single volume, and the specific names it records constitute, in aggregate, one of the strongest available refutations of the stereotype of Jain non-participation.

This chapter offers a partial reconstruction of that directory, in the form of an English-language listing of names recovered from the opening portions of the source. The listing is deliberately incomplete: it represents only a portion of the alphabetical range of the source, and even within that range it does not attempt to reproduce the individual biographical entries in the depth they receive in the original. What it does is establish, at the level of names and general regional attribution, the density of the population of Jain freedom fighters whose participation is documented in the source but whose names are not, at present, in the general national memory of the movement.

The listing that follows is organized by the general alphabetical order of the source. Where the source records multiple distinct individuals under the same given name — a common occurrence given the frequency of certain names in the population from which the participants were drawn — each individual is recorded separately, with the source's original disambiguation preserved to the extent it can be represented in English. The purpose of the listing is not biographical treatment; it is documentation of the scale of the population involved, so that a reader who encounters the argument of this book can see, at a glance and in aggregate, the number of individually documented Jain freedom fighters whose participation is on record.

Recovered Names, in Approximate Directory Order

From the earlier portions of the source directory, the following names are recovered as documented individual Jain freedom fighters. Regional attributions, where they appear in parentheses, indicate the town or district recorded in the source. Duplicate given names refer to separate individuals with distinct biographical entries in the source.

— Shrimati Angoori Devi Jain

— Shri Akshaykumar Jain

— Seth Achal Singh

— Shri Ajit Kumar Jain

— Babu Ajit Prasad Jain

— Shri Anand Rao Jain (Multai, Betul district)

— Shri Anandi Laal Jain (Indore)

— Shri Amar Chand Banthia (Gwalior, martyred 1858)

— Shri Arjun Lal Sethi

— Shri Ishwar Chand Jain (Pipariya Kalan, Jabalpur district)

— Shri Udai Chandra Jain (Mandla, martyred 1942)

— Shri Kaluram Jain

— Shri Babu Kishanlal Jain

— Shri Kishanlal Shah

— Shri Singhai Kunjilal Jain

— Shri Kundanlal Jain

— Shri Kundanlal Jain (a distinct individual, styled Nayak)

— Shri Kundanlal Malaiya

— Shri Kundanlal Samaiya (Jain)

— Shri Kusumkant Jain (Indore; later Constituent Assembly)

— Shri Kevalchand Jain

— Shri Kevalchand Jain (a distinct individual)

— Shrimati Kesharbai

— Shri Kesharimal Jain

— Shri Chandmal Chordia

— Shri Chandmal Jain

— Shri Chandmal Mehta

— Shri Chitranjan Kumar

— Shri Chintaman Jain

— Shri Chintaman Jain (a distinct individual)
— Babu Chimmanlal Jain ("Netaji")
— Shri Chiranjilal Vaidya
— Shri Chunnalal Jain
— Shri Chunnilal Jain
— Shri Chunnilal Jain (a distinct individual)
— Shri Chunnilal Jain (a third distinct individual)
— Babu Chetram Jain
— Shri Gyanchand Jain ("Gyanendra")
— Shri Gyanprakash Kala
— Shri Gyanichand Model
— Shri Gulabchand Kasliwal
— Shri Gulabchand Jain
— Shri Gulabchand Jain (a distinct individual)
— Shri Gulabchand Jain (a third distinct individual)
— Shri Gulabchand Jain ("Vaidya")
— Shri Gulabchand Jain ("Halwai")
— Shri Gulabchand Singhai
— Shri Gulabchand Seth
— Shri Gendmal Deshlahara
— Shri Gendmal Pokharna
— Shri Jhabbulal Jain
— Shri Babu Jhoomanlal Jain
— Shri Tikamchand Jain Pahadia
— Shri Tikaram Jain
— Shri Tikaram ("Vinodi")
— Shri Tekchand Jain
— Shri Dadamchand Doshi
— Shri Dalchand Jain (Ratlam)
— Shri Dal Chand Jain (a distinct individual; former MP, Sagar)
— Shri Digambarrao Jain (Khadke)
— Shri Dipchand Gothi
— Shri Dipchand Jain
— Shri Dipchand Jain (a distinct individual)

— Shri Dipchand Bakshi
— Shri Dipchand Malaiya
— Shri Dulichand Oswal
— Shri Dulichand Jain
— Shri Dulichand Jain (a distinct individual)
— Shri Dulichand Jain (a third distinct individual)
— Shri Dulichand Bhai Mehta
— Shri Dunichand Jain
— Shri Devraj Singhi
— Shri Nanhelal Jain
— Shri Nanhelal Jain (a distinct individual)
— Shri Nanhelal Bukharia
— Shri Narhar Kothari
— Shri Narendra Kumar Jain
— Shri Narendra Goyal
— Dr. Narendra Vidyarthi
— Shri Nathmal Mehta
— Shri Nathuram
— Shri Nathuram Pujari
— Shri Nathulal Jain
— Shri Nathusaav Jain
— Shri Singhai Nanakchandra Jain
— Shri Panchamlal Jain
— Shri Panchamlal Baisakhia
— Shri Panchamsingh Jain
— Shri Padamkumar Jain
— Shri Padamchand Jain
— Kshullak Padamsagar Ji Maharaj
— Shri Pannalal Jain
— Shri Pannalal Jain (a distinct individual)
— Shri Pannalal Jain (a third distinct individual)
— Shri Pannalal Jain (Seth; a fourth distinct individual)
— Vaidya Pannalal Jain ("Saral")
— Shri Pannalal Deriya

— Shri Pannalal Paiya

— Shri Prem Chand Jain (Singhai; martyred at Damoh, 1941)

— Shri Premchand Jain

— Shri Premchand Jain (a distinct individual)

— Shri Premchand Jain (a third distinct individual)

— Shri Premsukh Jhanjharia

— Shri Pyarchand Kasliwal

— Shri Phakirchand Jain

— Shri Lala Hukumchand Jain (martyred 1858)

— Shri Fakirchand Jain (martyred 1858)

— Shrimati Phoolkunwarbai Chordia

— Shri Phoolchand (Goyal) Agarwal Jain

— Shri Phoolchand Jain

— Shri Phoolchand Jain (a distinct individual)

— Shri Babulal Jain Deriya

— Shri Babulal Jain (multiple distinct individuals recorded in the source under this name)

— Shri Bhagchand Jain

— Shri Bhagchand Jain (a distinct individual)

— Vaidya Shri Bhanukumar Jain

— Shri Bhikamchand Jain

— Shri Bhikamchand Singhvi

— Shri Pandit Bhuvanendrakumar Shastri

— Shri Bhurelal Baya

— Shri Bherulal Bendmutha

— Shri Bhaiyalal Ganapati Deshkar

— Shri Bhaiyalal Jain

— Shri Bhaiyalal Jain ("Netaji")

— Shri Bhaiyalal Parwar

— Shri Bholanath Jain

— Shri Magan Laal Oswal (Jaora; fatally wounded 1942, died 1945)

— Shri Sabulaal Jain (Gadhakota; martyred 1942)

— Shrimati Tarabai Jain Kasliwal (Mahidpur; hunger-striker, 1942)

— Shri Jamnalal Bajaj (Wardha; industrialist and Congress treasurer)

— Sir Seth Hukumchand (Indore; industrialist and financier of the movement)

— Babu Jyoti Prasad Jain (Deoband; author of the suppressed article of 1930)

— Devendra Jain (Varanasi; former student of Syadvad Mahavidyalaya)

— Pandit Chainsukhdas Nyayatirtha (essayist of 'What Is Nationality?')

This listing represents, as noted, only a portion of the source directory's alphabetical range, and even that portion is presented at the level of names and short attributions rather than at the level of individual biographical entries. The source directory continues, beyond the range represented here, through further letters of the alphabet and through further hundreds of individually documented entries. The full recovery of that record, in a form accessible to English-language readers, is one of the specific pieces of work that a fuller version of this book would need to undertake.

What the partial listing above does establish, even at its current level of coverage, is the density of the documented population. The names listed here — well over a hundred individuals, with the source directory containing several hundred more — are not the names of an absent or passive community. They are the names of the ordinary participants in the freedom struggle at the district level, in the towns and small cities of central and northern India, whose contributions to the movement's foundation were as substantial in aggregate as any comparable community's contributions and whose specific participation the historical record has preserved in a form that permits recovery.

PART Seven

After

Chapter Twenty

The Constituent Assembly and After

The story of Jain participation in the founding of modern India does not end with independence in August 1947. It continues, in ways that are worth briefly tracing, into the constitutional founding of the republic and into the political and institutional life of the country in the decades that followed. This chapter takes up that continuation, in outline form, so that the reader has a sense of what happened to the movement's Jain participants after the movement's culminating moment had passed.

Kusumkant Jain of Indore, whose name appears in the directory listing of the previous chapter, was one of the Jain participants in the Constituent Assembly of India — the body that drafted the constitution of the republic between December 1946 and November 1949. His participation is a specific instance of the broader pattern by which the community's freedom-struggle participants moved, in the years after independence, into the institutional life of the new state. The Constituent Assembly's membership was not exclusively drawn from Congress freedom-struggle veterans, but the Congress veterans constituted its dominant faction, and the Jain freedom-struggle veterans who were included in that faction contributed to the drafting of the constitution on the same terms as their non-Jain colleagues.

Dal Chand Jain, whose case has been mentioned in earlier chapters as one of the Madhya Pradesh Quit India participants who was arrested multiple times during 1942, went on after independence to serve in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly and later in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the national Parliament. He also served as the president of the Madhya Pradesh Freedom Fighters Organization, one of the institutional structures that emerged after independence to represent the collective interests of those who had participated in the movement. His post-independence political career is one of the specific examples of the broader pattern by which the movement's participants translated their pre-independence political experience into post-independence political leadership.

The Bajaj family's post-independence trajectory is a case study in its own right of what happened to the merchant financiers of the movement after independence. Jamnalal Bajaj himself did not live to see independence — he died in 1942, under detention, as noted in the earlier chapter. His son Kamalnayan Bajaj and his adopted son (in the Gandhian rather than legal sense) Rahul Bajaj continued to run the Bajaj commercial empire, which

expanded substantially in the post-independence decades and became one of the flagship industrial houses of the Indian economy. The philanthropic institutions Jamnalal had founded — including the Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation, which continues to award its annual prizes in recognition of Gandhian constructive-programme work — have carried the specific ethical and political commitments of the freedom-struggle generation into the institutional life of independent India.

The Hukumchand family's post-independence trajectory has followed a similar general shape, with commercial expansion continuing under successive generations and with philanthropic activity continuing in the fields the elder Hukumchand had prioritized — education, temple-building, community welfare. The specific balance between commercial activity and philanthropic activity within the family's operations has shifted over generations, in ways characteristic of Indian industrial family businesses more generally, but the family's continued presence in Indian public life is one of the specific continuities between the pre-independence freedom struggle and the post-independence institutional order.

At the level of ordinary members of the community, rather than of the prominent families, the freedom-struggle generation of Jains transitioned into post-independence Indian life in the ways that were general to their generation across the country. Some accepted freedom-fighter pensions from the new state's administration; some declined to accept them, on the ground that they had not participated in the movement in order to receive compensation for their participation. Some continued in active political life; some withdrew into private life, having completed what they took to be their contribution to the founding of the country. Some remained in the towns and districts where they had participated in the movement; some moved to the cities and to the post-independence economy that was concentrating an increasing share of Indian activity in urban centers.

The community's institutional continuity — the temples, the community organizations, the philanthropic trusts, the educational institutions — carried the memory of the community's participation in the freedom struggle forward into the post-independence period, and it is largely through these institutions that the memory has been preserved in the community's own consciousness even as the national narrative has failed to preserve it comparably. The Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain compilation is itself an artifact of this community-institutional memory-preservation: it was published by a Jain scholarly institution, funded by Jain community donors, and distributed primarily through Jain community channels, and it represents the community's own attempt to keep the specific facts of its

freedom-struggle participation available in a form that would survive the failure of the national narrative to preserve them.

The relationship between community memory and national memory, in cases like this one, is one of the specific problems that the writing of Indian history in the twenty-first century has to work through. Community memory preserves specifics that national memory cannot afford to preserve at the same density; national memory produces integrations that community memory cannot easily accomplish from within a single community's perspective. The eventual full history of the Indian freedom struggle will need to draw on both — on the community-preserved specifics that ensure that no participant's contribution is entirely lost, and on the national-scale integrations that place the community-specific contributions in the context of the movement as a whole. This book, on its own modest scale, is an attempt to contribute to that eventual integration by taking one specific body of community-preserved memory — the memory of Jain participation — and rendering it in a form that the national conversation about the freedom struggle can, in principle, absorb.

Chapter Twenty-One

What Active Nonviolence Actually Means

It is worth, at the end of a long argument, being precise about the claim that has been made, so that neither its strength nor its limits can be misunderstood.

The claim is not that Jain communities were secretly a community of armed revolutionaries whose actual violence has been miscategorized as pacifism. Amar Chand Banthia's arming of the Rani's forces in 1857 is a real exception, and it belongs to a specific moment in Indian anti-colonial history — the moment before the Gandhian turn made nonviolent resistance the dominant technique of the movement — in which armed resistance was still the practical instrument through which the fight against British rule was being conducted. For the period after 1857, and especially for the Gandhian decades from 1920 through 1947, the Jain participation this book has documented was overwhelmingly nonviolent in its methods, in accordance with both the community's own ethical tradition and the strategic character of the movement it was participating in.

The claim is also not that the Jain community was individually more important to the freedom struggle than any other community that participated. India in the twentieth century contained hundreds of communities defined by region, language, religion, caste, occupation, and other axes of social organization, and every one of those communities contributed to the freedom struggle in ways that any honest history has to acknowledge. The Jain contribution was one contribution among many, and this book has been careful to say so.

The claim, positively stated, is threefold. First, that the Jain community's specific contribution to the freedom struggle has been systematically underdescribed in the general histories, and that this underdescription is a specific miscount that the historical record permits to be corrected. Second, that the underdescription is not merely an omission of names but an obscuring of the philosophical basis of the movement, because it renders invisible the specific religious and ethical tradition that had, over centuries, developed the discipline of nonviolence into the form that Gandhi was able to convert into a political technique. Third, that the correction of the miscount, once undertaken, changes not only the roll of individuals we know about but the account of what nonviolent resistance actually is and what it costs the people who practice it.

This third claim is the one that most fully repays the effort of correction. The passivity stereotype survives because nonviolence, viewed from outside and at a distance, looks like the absence of activity. No weapons are drawn. No blows are struck by the resister. No casualties are inflicted on the opposing side. The visible signature of political action — the physical assertion of force against an adversary — is, in the case of nonviolent resistance, missing. And the natural inference, from the absence of the visible signature, is that no action is actually taking place.

This inference is wrong, and the record of Jain participation in the freedom struggle is one of the specific bodies of evidence that shows why it is wrong. The action that was taking place — in the treasurer's decision to open the vault, in the merchant's decision to fund the movement he knew was illegal, in the editor's decision to publish the article he knew would be seized, in the student's decision to walk into the flag-hoisting procession he knew might be fired on, in the woman's decision to hunger-strike at the police station until she was permitted to share her husband's imprisonment, in the child's decision to lead the procession he knew was heading toward armed colonial forces — was action in the fullest political sense. It required decision, courage, and the acceptance of consequences that could include and often did include physical suffering and, in a number of cases, death. It differed from the action of armed resistance not in its intensity but in its direction: rather than inflicting suffering on the opponent, it accepted suffering from the opponent, and it did so on the specific philosophical calculation that the accepted suffering would produce moral consequences that inflicted suffering could not have produced.

This is what active nonviolence actually means. It is not the absence of political action. It is a specific form of political action, more demanding than armed action in some respects, less demanding in others, whose specific technique places the entire physical cost of the confrontation on the resister rather than on the opponent. It succeeds, when it succeeds, by transferring the moral weight of the confrontation from the resister to the opponent, and by making the opponent's continued imposition of suffering visibly and undeniably unjust in a way that armed resistance, which invites reciprocal violence, cannot achieve.

The Jain community's participation in the Indian freedom struggle was, disproportionately, participation of this active-nonviolent kind. That the community's participation has been so systematically miscounted in the popular history is not, therefore, merely an injury to the community's memory of itself. It is an injury to the general understanding of what nonviolent political action is and what it can accomplish. To recover the roll of Jain freedom fighters — the treasurers, the merchants, the editors, the

students, the women, the children — is to recover, in specific and demonstrated form, the evidence that active nonviolence is a real and consequential form of political action, and that a community whose ethical formation has trained it for that kind of action is not a community that has retreated from politics but a community that has brought a specific and formidable political technique to the shared struggle.

That is the claim of this book. It has been made, in the preceding chapters, through the presentation of specific evidence: the philosophical background in Jain thought, the biographical facts of specific individuals across the period from 1857 to 1947, the institutional record of Jain financing, publishing, and educational infrastructure, and the roll of individual freedom fighters recovered from the community's own compilation-work. The evidence is preliminary, in the sense that a fuller version of the same argument would require substantially more archival research than the current draft has undertaken, and would need to be checked at every specific factual claim against the primary sources on which the community's compilation-work was itself based. The direction of the argument, however, is clear. Jain participation in the Indian freedom struggle was substantial, sustained, and philosophically consequential, and any account of the freedom struggle that omits it is an account whose omission has both factual and philosophical costs.

Conclusion

A Note to the Reader

A book of this kind is more useful if its author is direct about what it has done and what it has not done, and this closing note attempts that directness so that the reader can weigh what has been read at its proper strength.

What this book has done: assembled, in a single English-language narrative, the case that the Jain contribution to India's freedom struggle has been systematically underdescribed in the general histories, and that the record permits the correction of that underdescription. It has drawn on published English-language secondary sources for the general shape of the argument, and on the Hindi-language compilation Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain by Kapoorchand Jain and Jyoti Jain for the specific names, dates, and case details that give the argument its factual density. It has organized the material into seven parts covering the philosophical background, the 1857 rebellion, the Gandhian decades, the Jain nationalist press, the record of imprisonment and martyrdom, a partial directory of individual freedom fighters, and the post-independence continuation. It has tried, throughout, to be honest about what it was doing and about the limits of what it was doing.

What this book has not done: it has not conducted primary archival research in the district records, freedom-fighter pension files, and other governmental sources that would be required to verify each specific claim against its original documentary basis. It has not translated the source volume it draws on, or reproduced the source's prose; the debts to the source have been stated in the surrounding text, and readers wanting the source itself should seek out the original. It has not attempted to be a comprehensive biographical treatment of the individuals it names; the directory chapter in particular is a listing of names rather than a set of full biographical entries, and it covers only a portion of the source directory's alphabetical range. It has not attempted to place Jain participation in comparative perspective against the participation of other Indian communities; the argument has been framed as a correction of a specific miscount, not as a comparative claim about which community contributed the most.

A serious future version of the same argument would require, at minimum, the following: full biographical treatment of each named individual in the

source directory, based on the source's own entries and supplemented by such primary archival research as can be conducted at this distance; systematic checking of every specific factual claim against primary sources; substantial expansion of the material on women's participation, which the current draft acknowledges to be undertreated; addition of material on Jain participation in regions outside the source's Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan focus, particularly Gujarat, the Deccan, and the Karnataka coast; and full engagement with the professional historical scholarship on the Indian freedom struggle that would allow the Jain-specific argument to be integrated with the broader interpretive frameworks now dominant in the field.

This book is offered, in its current form, as a foundation on which such fuller work can be built. Its argument is not intended as the last word on the subject; it is intended as an argument that puts the subject firmly on the table, in a form that other researchers, other writers, and other members of the reading public can engage with, criticize, extend, and correct. The recovery of the Jain contribution to the Indian freedom struggle is, ultimately, a project too large for any single book, and too important to leave to books alone. The proper form of the recovery is a sustained scholarly and popular engagement, running over years and drawing on the work of many hands. If this book contributes to the beginning of that engagement, it will have done what it was written to do.

Sources and Method

This book was compiled primarily from two categories of source: a Hindi-language community compilation drawn on for specific facts, and a set of English-language secondary works drawn on for the general shape of the argument. The specific sources used are listed below, followed by notes on the method by which they were combined.

Primary Community Source

— Dr. Kapoorchand Jain and Dr. (Mrs.) Jyoti Jain, Swatantrata Sangram Me Jain, second edition (Muzaffarnagar: Prachya Shraman Bharti, 2006). Published by the Shri Kailashchand Jain Smriti Nyas of the Kund-Kund Jain College at Khatauli. Dedicated to Upadhyaya Muni Shri 108 Gyansagar Ji Maharaj. The book runs to 474 pages and is organized in five main sections: opening vignettes; a historical overview of the freedom movement; an account of major events; a section on Jain martyrs (Amar Jain Shahid); and the main alphabetical directory of individual Jain freedom fighters from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Appendices reproduce selected primary documents including the 1930 Deoband article and the 1947 Jain Sandesh essays discussed in the text. This book was used as the source for names, dates, towns, and specific case details; no portion of its original Hindi prose is translated or reproduced in this English narrative.

English-Language Secondary Sources

— "Contribution of Jain Freedom Fighters of Madhya Pradesh in getting Independence (1857-1947)," TIJER International Research Journal, tijer.org (April 2023 paper by researchers in the field of Jain history).

— "Behind the Scenes: 10 Financiers Who Funded India's Freedom Movement," The Statesman.

— "Jamnalal Bajaj, the Gandhian capitalist who was the Mahatma's 'Merchant Prince'," ThePrint.

— "Jamnalal Bajaj, The Fifth Son," SabrangIndia.

— Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation, official biography materials at jamnalalbajajfoundation.org.

— Ahimsa Foundation (jainsamaj.org), Jain history and freedom-fighter resource pages.

— General reference sources on the Indian independence movement, including standard treatments of the 1857 rebellion, the Non-

Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements, the Quit India movement, and the constitutional founding of the Republic of India.

Method

The book was constructed in a sequence of passes. The first pass established the general argument from English-language secondary sources and produced the framing chapters on the stereotype, the philosophical background, and the general shape of Jain participation. The second pass returned to the Hindi-language source and extracted specific factual material — names, dates, town attributions, prison terms, documented incidents, appendix documents — that could be used to give the argument its factual density. The third pass integrated the factual material from the source with the argument from the secondary literature, producing the chapter-length narratives on 1857, the Gandhian financiers, the presses, the jails, and the roll. The fourth pass added the philosophical framing chapters that place the historical narrative in the context of Jain religious and philosophical tradition. The fifth pass produced the concluding material, the sources statement, and this method note.

Throughout the process, the guiding principle was that the source's original prose would not be translated or reproduced, but that the facts the source records would be treated as available for original English narrative and analysis. Where a specific fact is drawn from the source, this is stated in the surrounding text. Where a claim is drawn from the secondary literature, the source is identified in the bibliography above. Where a general framing is offered without specific attribution, the framing represents the author's own synthesis of the material and should be understood as such.

A final word on scale. The current book is a first substantive draft rather than a finished scholarly work. It is meant to demonstrate that the subject can support a full-length treatment in English, and to provide a structural foundation on which such treatments — including, in principle, a full scholarly translation and expanded English edition of the source itself — could be built. Readers who find the argument compelling are invited to continue the work in whatever forms their own capacities and interests suggest. The recovery of this history is a large project, and it needs many hands.